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NOTE
OWNING THE CENTER OF THE EARTH:
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING AND
SUBSURFACE TRESPASS IN THE
MARCELLUS SHALE REGION
Colleen E. Lamarre*
Hydraulic fracturing, a drilling technology that involves directional
drilling and the propagation of pressurized fluid to fracture shale, has
made the extraction of natural gas from the Marcellus Shale in the
Northeastern United States an economically viable venture. Despite its
potential economic benefits, hydraulic fracturing has inflamed public
opinion over its possible environmental effects (for example, ground-
water contamination). One concern, sometimes overlooked in the public
debate, is the effect hydraulic fracturing may have on the property rights
of landowners with property adjacent to the drilling site.
Hydraulic fracturing has been used for decades in Texas and other
prolific oil and gas producing states. In these states the courts have
haphazardly addressed the property rights of landowners whose property
has been encroached on by hydraulic fracturing on adjacent plots. Sev-
eral of these courts have applied the rule of capture and the correlative
rights doctrine to determine landowners' property rights, while others
have applied the non-ownership theory. Because hydraulic fracturing is
new to the Marcellus Shale region states and, as such, they lack a devel-
oped body of case law, these states-especially New York-should treat
the issue as one offirst impression. States in the Marcellus Shale region
should consider the issue de novo and apply well-established property
theories that accord with the public policy of the state. This Note sug-
gests that through the application of subsurface trespass theory and con-
sideration of case law regarding drilling processes analogically similar
to hydraulic fracturing-such as directional drilling, secondary recovery
and storage operations, and coal and coalbed methane gas extraction-
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courts and state legislatures have the opportunity to create law which
best reflects the needs and values of the Marcellus Shale region states.
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INTRODUCTION
The prospect of employing hydraulic fracturing1 technology to drill
for natural gas in the Northeastern United States has sparked an intense
legal debate over the socioeconomics of land development, the environ-
mental effects of hydraulic fracturing, and individual property rights. 2
The Marcellus Shale, "a black shale formation extending deep under-
ground from Ohio and West Virginia northeast into Pennsylvania and
southern New York," may contain up to 489 trillion cubic feet of natural
gas.3 The low porosity, permeability, and depth of the Marcellus Shale
1 "Hydraulic fracturing consists of pumping a fluid and a propping material such as
sand down the well under high pressure to create fractures in the gas-bearing rock. The prop-
ping material . .. holds the fractures open, allowing more gas to flow into the well than would
naturally ... Hydraulic fracturing technology is especially helpful for 'tight' rocks like shale."
N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, Marcellus Shale, http://www.dec.ny.gov/en-
ergy/46288.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2011).
2 The New York Times recently published "Drilling Down," a series of articles high-
lighting the benefits, risks, and politics surrounding hydraulic fracturing. See Ian Urbina,
Pressure Stifles Efforts to Police Drilling for Gas, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2011, at Al, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/04/us/04gas.html?ref=drillingdown.
3 N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, Marcellus Shale, supra note 1.
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make hydraulic fracturing the preferred method of extracting natural gas
from the shale.4 For many landowners, the prospect of leasing land for
drilling represents a "modem-day gold rush" that could provide relief to
struggling farmers, create jobs for citizens, and produce much needed
clean energy.5 Other individuals are concerned with the possible relin-
quishment of land rights and the unknown, potentially negative, environ-
mental impact caused by hydraulic fracturing, a relatively new
technology. 6
While Texas and other prolific oil and gas producing states have
used hydraulic fracturing to extract oil and gas in tight reservoir forma-
tions for over sixty years,7 the technology only recently has advanced
sufficiently to make extracting natural gas from the dense Marcellus
Shale profitable.8 As such, the regional impacts of hydraulic fracturing
are relatively unknown9 and the legal doctrine is ripe for development
and interpretation. Though providing some legal guidance,"o other oil
and gas producing states' application of oil and gas laws and public pol-
icy should not unduly influence the Marcellus Shale region states' devel-
opment or interpretation of the doctrine regarding hydraulic fracturing.
These states' doctrinal interpretations often reflect outdated surveying
and drilling technologies that are not employed in this region." Because
this new technology enables the possibility and profitability of drilling in
the Marcellus Shale region, the development of legal precedent in the
area should reflect the significant geological, historical, and technologi-
cal differences between the Marcellus Shale states and other oil and gas
producing states.
Section I of this Note introduces the technology used to hydrauli-
cally fracture shale rock formations. Section II provides an overview of
the development of oil and gas law and the property theories governing
oil and gas ownership. Section III posits how the doctrine of subsurface
4 See id.
5 Mireya Navarro, At Odds Over Land, Money and Gas, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2009, at
A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/28/science/earthl28drill.html?pagewanted
=all.
6 See id.
7 See e.g., Laura H. Bumey & Norman J. Hyne, Hydraulic Fracturing: Stimulating Your
Well or Trespassing?, 44 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. §§ 19.01, 19.02 (1998) ("The first frac
job was done by Pan American Petroleum (Amoco) on a well in the Hugoton gas field in
Kansas. Haliburton [sic] was granted an exclusive license for hydraulic fracturing in 1949.
This exclusive license was withdrawn in 1953 and now many service companies offer the
service.").
8 See N.Y. STATE DEPT OF ENvTL. CONSERVATION, Marcellus Shale, supra note 1.
9 See N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, SUPPLEMENTAL GENERIC ENVIRON-
MENTAL IMPAcr STATEMENT ON THE OIL, GAS AND SOLUTION MINING REGULATORY PROGRAM
9-16 (rev. drft. Sept. 7, 2011), http://www.dec.ny.gov/data/dmn/rdsgeisfull0911.pdf.
10 See Burney & Hyne, supra note 7, § 19.04.
11 See id.
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trespass may provide legal protection to landowners wishing to protect
their subsurface estate from hydraulic fracturing. Section IV provides an
overview of case law addressing hydraulic fracturing, subsurface tres-
pass, and analogically similar processes. Finally, this Note concludes
that New York State should adopt a rule of subsurface trespass that ac-
counts for modem technology and the development of the oil and gas
industry in the Marcellus Shale region.
I. HYDRAULIC FRACTURING TECHNOLOGY
Hydraulic fracturing, commonly referred to as "fracking," is used to
release oil and gas from "tight" shale and other sedimentary rocks. 12
Though seemingly simple, hydraulic fracturing involves several steps.' 3
Prior to hydraulic fracturing, a well is drilled vertically.14 Once the well
reaches the depth of the shale, special tools are used to continue drilling
the well horizontally within the shale.' 5 Hydraulic fracturing is accom-
plished by pumping pressurized fluid down the well to fracture the reser-
voir rock.16 This process releases oil and gas from the shale and "creates
channels for the oil and gas to flow through the reservoir into the well."' 7
In the article Hydraulic Fracturing: Stimulating Your Well or Trespass-
ing?, Laura H. Burney and Norman J. Hyne provide a detailed descrip-
tion of the hydraulic fracturing process:
Frac jobs are done in three stages. First, a volume of the
frac fluid called the pad is pumped under pressure down
the well to initiate and propagate fractures in the reser-
voir rock. During the second stage, a slurry of the frac
fluid and propping agents (proppants) is pumped down
the well to extend the fractures and carry the propping
agents deep into the fractures. In the last stage called
backflush, the frac fluid is pumped back up the well
leaving the propping agents to hold open the fractures.*
12 Id. § 19.02 ("The term tight sands has been used to include all low permeability reser-
voirs such as siltstones, shales, and carbonates.").
13 See infra Figure 1 and text accompanying notes 12-22 for an illustration of the hy-
draulic fracturing process.
14 See N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, Marcellus Shale, supra note 1.
15 See id.
16 See Burney & Hyne, supra note 7, § 19.02, at 19-12 ("Up to seven or eight additives
are commonly used in the frac fluids. These include fluid-loss additives, biocides, breakers,
buffers, surfactants, nonemulsifiers, clay stabilizers, foamers, friction reducers, temperature
stabilizers, and diverting agents.").
17 Id. § 19.02.
18 Id.
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Modem science and technology make the volume and length of the frac-
tures predictable19 before the shale is fractured: "The volume of the frac-
tures (height x length x width) is directly proportional to the volume of
the frac fluid pumped."20 Although more difficult to predict, the "length
of the fracture is inversely related to the height of the fracture. Lower
fracture heights correspond to longer fractures with the same volume of
frac fluid pumped."21 Oil and gas flow through the hydraulically created
fractures to the well. 2 2
The Marcellus Shale is rich in natural gas. 2 3 The gas is trapped
between 2,000 feet to 7,000 feet below the earth's surface. 24 Generally,
hydraulic fracturing increases well production by 5% to 15%.25 In the
case of the Marcellus Shale, hydraulic fracturing is perhaps the only eco-
nomically viable option to recover oil and gas.2 6
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN OIL AND GAS LAW:
THEORIES OF OWNERSHIP
At the 2011 Energy Conference hosted by Cornell Law School, at-
torney Helen Slottje argued that an examination of what rights property
owners hold in their property must precede any determination of what
legal remedies are available to them.2 7 While this Note focuses primarily
on whether trespass law provides landowners a legal remedy against sub-
surface intrusion caused by hydraulic fracturing, this question intrinsi-
cally is linked to theories of property ownership. Property law defines
and protects interests in physical property; control over surface acreage
alone does not delineate ownership.28 The concept of "[o]wnership con-
19 Id. During the 2011 Energy Conference held at Cornell Law School, William Kappel,
a hydrogeologist, commented that the fractures created by hydraulic fracturing are "paper thin"
and that through micro-seismic monitoring the specific details about the fracture can be deter-
mined before the fracture and measured thereafter. See William Kappel, U.S. Geological Sur-
vey, Remarks at the Cornell Law School 2011 Energy Conference: Gas Drilling, Sustainability
& Energy Policy (Apr. 2, 2011), http://streams.lawschool.cornell.edulmediasite/Viewer/?peid=
48442bc606ca4eddb47b32bdaae657e61d.
20 Burney & Hyne, supra note 7, § 19.02.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 See N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, Marcellus Shale, supra
note 1.
24 See id.
25 See Burney & Hyne, supra note 1, § 19.02.
26 See N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, Marcellus Shale, supra
note 1.
27 See Helen Slottje, Cmty. Envtl. Def. Council, Remarks at the Cornell Law School
2011 Energy Conference: Gas Drilling, Sustainability & Energy Policy (Apr. 2, 2011), http://
streams.lawschool.cornell.edulmediasiteNiewer/?peid=48442bc606ca4eddb47b32bdaae657e6
Id.
28 See A.W. Walker, Jr., Nature of the Landowner's Interest in Oil and Gas, 17 Mo'r.
L. REV. 22, 22 (1955-1956).
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sists not of the physical property itself, but of a complex group or bundle
of legally enforceable rights, powers and privileges with respect to that
physical property." 29 Simply said, landowners are entitled to a legal
remedy only if subsurface oil and gas estates are sticks in the proverbial
bundle. Therefore, theories of property ownership provide a basis for
determining landowners' rights and remedies against trespass. 30
Over time, changes in land use, technology, and public policy have
modified the legal theories of property ownership. The development of
the oil and gas industry profoundly altered the way courts applied the ad
coelum doctrine.3' The ad coelum doctrine gave way to the introduction
of the rule of capture and the correlative rights doctrine, and the eventual
evolution of the ownership-in-place and non-ownership theories, which
currently govern oil and gas ownership in most states.32 When these two
ownership theories first developed, courts lacked common law precedent
and scientific information regarding the nature of subsurface oil and
gas. 3 3 Much of oil and gas law developed through analogy to the owner-
ship of other physical substances-such as water, wild animals, and
coal.34
A. The Ad Coelum Doctrine
Prior to the development of the commercial oil and gas industry and
the implementation of policies encouraging production thereof, the com-
mon law followed the ad coelum doctrine: cujus est solum, ejus est usque
ad coelum et ad inferos.35 According to the ad coelum doctrine, land
ownership extended from the core of the earth to the sky.3 6 The advent
of the commercial oil and gas industry in the 1850s led to significant
changes to the doctrine. 37 While the doctrine was easily applied to
"hard" minerals, the transitory nature of oil and gas made application of
the ad coelum doctrine impracticable.38 As many courts have stated: "It
is ancient doctrine that [] common law ownership of the land extended
29 Id.
30 See id. at 23-25.
31 See Terry D. Ragsdale, Hydraulic Fracturing: The Stealthy Subsurface Trespass, 28
TULSA L.J. 311, 313-14 (1993).
32 See I HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 203, at
26-32 (2010). The qualified ownership and ownership in place theories also developed from
the ad coelum doctrine. These theories are mostly of academic interest and are applied in only
a very few states. See id. §§ 203.2-203.3.
33 Walker, supra note 28, at 23.
34 See id.
35 Ragsdale, supra note 31, at 313 ("[O]wnership of the surface extended upwards to the
heavens and downwards to the center of the earth.").
36 See id.
37 See id.
38 See JOHN S. LOWE, OIL AND GAS LAW IN A NUTSHELL 9 (4th ed. 2003) ("Oil and gas
are fugacious; they move from place to place within sedimentary rock. In addition, oil and gas
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to the periphery of the universe .. . But that doctrine has no place in the
modem world."3 9 States' adoption of policies encouraging commercial
oil and gas production drove courts to interpret laws in favor of produc-
tion and to limit landowners' individual property rights. States feared
that the continued application of the ad coelum doctrine would deter or
slow oil and gas development: "Mineral owners would have been dis-
couraged from drilling by the fear of liability for drainage from their
neighbors' properties."4 0 Addressing these concerns, courts adapted the
ad coelum doctrine by applying the rule of capture and by distinguishing
oil and gas ownership from ownership of other solid minerals. 4 '
1. The Rule of Capture
The common law rule of capture holds that "[T]he first person to
reduce subsurface oil or gas to physical possession [becomes] the owner
of [the] same regardless of whether the product was in fact extracted
from beneath the surface of that person's property." 42 However, the rule
of capture assumes that oil and gas migrate within reservoirs and be-
tween property lines.43 The Texas Supreme Court described the rule of
capture in Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co.:
[Clourts generally have come to recognize that oil and
gas, as commonly found in underground reservoirs, are
securely entrapped in a static condition in the original
pool, and, ordinarily, so remain until disturbed by pene-
trations from the surface. It is further established, never-
theless, that these minerals will migrate across property
are fungible; it is difficult to determine whether a given MCF [metric cubic foot] of gas or
barrel of oil produced has been drawn from under one tract of land or another.").
39 Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 799 (1972) (quoting United States v. Causby, 328 U.S.
256, 260-61 (1946)). The ad coelum doctrine has been modified or disregarded all together in
other areas of property ownership; for example, the use of the doctrine regarding ownership of
airspace has been significantly limited. See Owen L. Anderson, Subsurface "Trespass": A
Man's Subsurface is Not His Castle, 49 WASHBURN L.J. 247, 253-54 (2010) ("Airplane tres-
pass cases have universally rejected a strict adherence to the ad coelum doctrine. In general,
the use of airspace by airplanes is not actionable, unless a landowner suffers actual
damages.").
40 LowE, supra note 38, at 8-9.
41 See Ragsdale, supra note 31, at 314-16.
42 In re W. Land Servs., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 26 A.D.3d 15, 16-17 (N.Y.
App. Div. 3d Dep't 2005).
43 See ANR Pipeline Co. v. 60 Acres of Land, 418 F. Supp. 2d 933, 939 (W.D. Mich.
2006). The assumption that gas migrates between property lines is inherent in the rule of
capture. However, in the case of the Marcellus Shale, gas does not migrate prior to the physi-
cal trespass. Rather it is the trespass itself which releases the gas from the tight shale pores
that enables the gas to migrate. See N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION,
Marcellus Shale, supra note 1. As discussed infra in Section IV, this fundamental difference
in geologic structure suggests that shale gas should not be treated the same as other truly
fugacious substances.
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lines towards any low pressure area created by produc-
tion from the common pool. This migratory character of
oil and gas has given rise to the so-called rule or law of
capture. That rule simply is that the owner of a tract of
land acquires title to the oil or gas which he produces
from wells on his land, though part of the oil or gas may
have migrated from adjoining lands. He may thus ap-
propriate the oil and gas that have flowed from adjacent
lands without the consent of the owner of those lands,
and without incurring liability to him for drainage."
As applied, the rule of capture limits landowners' liability for draining
reservoirs spanning across property lines, thereby encouraging oil and
gas production. 45 According to the rule of capture, a non-consenting
landowner's remedy against drainage from a common oil or gas pool is
one of self-help-landowners have the option to "go and do likewise." 46
Application of the rule of capture encourages a race to drill, which his-
torically has "resulted in the drilling of excessive wells, which, in turn,
created considerable waste."47
While theoretically the rule of capture shields drillers from liability
for drainage from a common pool, in application this protection is not
without limits. 4 8 For example, regardless of the theory of ownership
adopted, the rule of capture does not permit trespass.49 As Caleb Fielder
comments, "in the hunt for oil and gas[,] one may not violate the subsur-
face boundaries dividing disparate mineral estates in the name of the rule
of capture."50 Moreover, the correlative rights doctrine and statutory
limitations to the rule of capture may protect those with a property inter-
est in the common gas or oil source.5'
44 Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558, 561-62 (Tex. 1948). See Ragsdale,
supra note 31, at 313-14.
45 See Elliff, 210 S.W.2d at 562.
46 See ANR Pipeline, 418 F. Supp. 2d at 940 (quoting Wronski v. Sun Oil Co., 279
N.W.2d 564, 569 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979)).
47 W. Land Servs., 26 A.D.3d at 17.
48 See Bruce M. Kramer, Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, Some New
Paradigms for the Rule of Capture and Implied Covenant Jurisprudence, 30 ENERGY & MIN. L.
INST. 330, 333 (2009).
49 See id. at 336-41.
50 Caleb Fielder, I Drink Your Milkshake: The Status of Hydraulic Fracture Stimulation
in the Wake of Coastal v. Garza, 46 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 17, 25 (2009).
51 See WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 32, § 204.6, at 60.8-60.11. Statutorily imposed
limitations vary among states and are beyond the scope of this paper.
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2. Correlative Rights Doctrine
The correlative rights doctrine limits the liability shield created by
the rule of capture and addresses concerns of fairness and waste.5 2
Under this doctrine, "each owner has a right to a fair and equitable share
of the oil and gas under his land." 53 In the classic case of Elliff v. Texon
Drilling Co.,54 the Texas Supreme Court detailed the corollary relation-
ship between the rule of capture and the correlative rights doctrine.55
The respondent, Texon Drilling, negligently allowed one of its wells to
blow out and burn.56 The well, located on property adjoining the peti-
tioner's, drained from a common pool; subsequent to the blow-out, the
well drained from the petitioner's property.5 7 The petitioner sued for
damages and lost oil and gas.58 Texon defended by asserting that the
rule of capture protected it from any liability for drainage.59 The Texas
Supreme Court rejected Texon's argument: "No owner should be permit-
ted to carry on his operations in reckless or lawless irresponsibility, but
must submit to such limitations as are necessary to enable each to get his
own" 60 The court further explained the underlying rationale and function
of the correlative rights doctrine:
These existing property relations, called the correlative
rights of the owners of land in the common source of
supply, were not created by the statute, but held to exist
because of the peculiar physical facts of oil and gas. The
term "correlative rights" is merely a convenient method
of indicating that each owner of land in a common
source of supply of oil and gas has legal privileges as
against other owners of land therein to take oil or gas
therefrom by lawful operations conducted on his own
land; that each such owner has duties to the other owners
not to exercise his privileges of taking so as to injure the
common source of supply; and that each such owner has
rights that other owners not exercise their privileges of
taking so as to injure the common source of supply. 61
In sum, the correlative rights doctrine augments the rule of capture
to provide that each property owner sharing a common source has a fair
52 See LOWE, supra note 38, at 14-15.
53 Id. at 14.
54 210 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. 1948).
55 See id. at 562-63.
56 See id. at 559.
57 See id.
58 See id.
59 See id. at 559-60.
60 Id. at 562.
61 Id. at 562-63 (quoting 1 W.L. SUMMERS, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 63 (perm. ed.)).
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chance to produce oil and gas from the reservoir. 62 Several states have
statutorily adopted this doctrine. 63 Generally, landowners are entitled to
a share of the oil or gas based on the "proportion that the quantity of
recoverable oil and gas under his or her land bears to the quantity in the
reservoir."64
B. Ownership-in-Place Doctrine
The ownership-in-place doctrine is a close relative of the ad coelum
doctrine; in developing this doctrine, courts likened oil and gas to soil
and other hard minerals. 65 Courts "rationalized that since oil and gas
were a part of the soil, they were owned in place by the owner of the land
in addition to the [landowner's] exclusive right to explore for, develop,
and produce [oil and gas]." 66 In Wronski v. Sun Oil Co.,67 the Court of
Appeals of Michigan explained the ownership-in-place doctrine:
Under this theory "the nature of the interest of the land-
owner in oil and gas contained in his land is the same as
his interest in solid minerals." Solid minerals are a part
of the land in or beneath which they are located, and as a
consequence the owner of land is also the owner of the
oil and gas in or beneath it.68
Texas and many other prolific oil and gas producing states have
adopted the ownership-in-place theory.69 In 1923, the Texas Supreme
Court explained in Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 7 0 an
oft-quoted decision, that according to the ownership-in-place theory, no
"distinction in principle lies between the title acquired under a grant of
solid minerals and the title acquired under a grant in the same form of
gas and oil."7 1 Moreover, the court opined that "gas and oil in place are
minerals and realty, subject to ownership, severance and sale, while em-
bedded in the sands or rocks beneath the earth's surface, in like manner
and to the same extent as is coal or any other solid mineral." 72
62 See id.
63 See, e.g., N.Y. ENVrL. CONSERV. LAW § 23-0301 (McKinney 2007).
64 LowE, supra note 38, at 15.
65 See id. at 29-30.
66 Id. at 30.
67 279 N.W.2d 564 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979).
68 Id. at 569 (quoting WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 32, § 203.3); accord Carbon
County v. Union Reserve Coal Co., 898 P.2d 680, 685 (Mont. 1995); Stephens County v. Mid-
Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 254 S.W. 290, 292 (Tex. 1923).
69 See WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 32, § 203.1.
70 254 S.W. 290 (Tex. 1923).
71 Id. at 292.
72 Id.
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CHART 1:
Chart 1 Ownership Theories Applied to Shale States,
1 HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW
§ 203 at 32 (2010).
Shale Development State Ownership Theory
Barnett Texas Ownership-in-Place
Fayetteville Arkansas Ownership-in-Place
Louisiana Non-Ownership
Texas Ownership-in-Place
New York Non-Ownership
Pennsylvania Ownership-in-Place
Marcellus Ohio Non-Ownership
Maryland Ownership-in-Place
West Virginia Ownership-in-Place
Michigan Ownership-in-Place
Antrim Ohio Ownership-in-Place
Indiana Non-Ownership
Indiana Non-Ownership
New Albany Kentucky Non-Ownership
Illinois Non-Ownership
Furthermore, migratory minerals are subject to the rule of capture. In
Wronski, the court explained the relationship between the ownership-in-
place doctrine and the rule of capture:
Oil and gas, unlike other minerals, do not remain con-
stantly in place in the ground, but may migrate across
property lines. Because of this migratory tendency the
rule of capture evolved.
This rule provides: "The owner of a tract of land
acquires title to the oil and gas which he produces from
wells drilled thereon, though it may be proved that part
of such oil or gas migrated from adjoining lands. Under
this rule, absent some state regulation of drilling prac-
tices, a landowner is not liable to adjacent landowners
whose lands are drained as a result of such operations." 73
The ownership-in-place doctrine vests a corporeal right-a right of
current possession-in the landowner.74 This ownership right terminates
73 279 N.W. at 569 (quoting WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 32, § 204.4).
74 See id.
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if the oil or gas migrates from the landowner's parcel.75 Under this the-
ory, ownership of minerals, including fugacious oil and gas, rests with
the landowner. 76
C. Non-Ownership Theory
The development of the oil and gas industry and the common law
adoption of the rule of capture led some courts to analogize transitory
minerals to wild animals and water.77 Focusing on the migratory nature
of oil and gas, courts treated oil and gas as ferae naturae ("of a wild
nature") 8 and applied the rule of capture to oil and gas in the same
manner as they had to wild animals.79 These early courts "sought to
justify departing from precedent by distinguishing ownership of oil and
gas from other [non-migratory] substances found in the earth."80 In
Kelly v. Ohio Oil Co.,8 1 the Supreme Court of Ohio commented on the
fugacious nature of oil and gas and the impact of this characteristic on
landowners' interests in oil and gas:
Petroleum oil is a mineral, and while in the earth it is
part of the realty, and, should it move from place to
place by percolation or otherwise, it forms part of that
tract of land in which it tarries for the time being, and, if
it moves to the next adjoining tract, it becomes part and
parcel of that tract.82
75 See id.
76 Low, supra note 38.
77 See, e.g., People's Gas Co. v. Tyner, 31 N.E. 59, 60 (Ind. 1892).
78 Although Pennsylvania currently subscribes to the ownership-in-place theory, the Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania explained the wild nature of oil and gas in Westmoreland &
Cambria Natural Gas Co. v. DeWitt:
Water and oil, and still more strongly gas, may be classed by themselves, if the
analogy be not too fanciful, as minerals ferae naturae. In common with animals,
and unlike other minerals, they have the power and the tendency to escape without
the volition of the owner. Their fugitive and wandering existence within the limits
of a particular tract was uncertain. They belong to the owner of the land, and are
part of it, so long as they are on or in it, and are subject to his control; but when they
escape, and go into other land, or come under another's control, the title of the
former owner is gone. Possession of the land, therefore, is not necessarily posses-
sion of the gas. If an adjoining, or even a distant, owner, drills his own land, and taps
your gas, so that it comes into his well and under his control, it is no longer yours,
but his.
18 A. 724, 725 (Pa. 1889) (internal citations omitted).
79 See Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175, 177-78 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (applying the rule of
capture to wild animals in a claim for trespass); Owen L. Anderson, Subsurface Trespass after
Coastal v. Garza, 60 E. OIL & GAs L. & TAX'N 65, 69 (2009).
80 LowE, supra note 38, at 29.
81 49 N.E. 399, 401 (Ohio 1897).
82 Id. at 401.
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Accordingly, under the non-ownership theory, the landowner has an in-
terest in oil or gas only so long as it remains under the landowner's
parcel.83
In non-ownership states, a landowner's interest in the oil or gas be-
neath her property is an "exclusive right to reduce them to possession at
which time they become personal property and are subject to ownership
as such."84 Prior to extraction, "[o]il and gas in the earth cannot be the
subject of an ownership distinct from the soil. They belong to the owner
of the land only so long as they remain under the land."8 5 Unlike the
possessory right held by owners in ownership-in-place jurisdictions,
landowners in non-ownership jurisdictions hold an incorporeal right to
use the land.86 This right of "use" includes "the right to reduce the oil
and gas to possession or to sever this right for economic
consideration."87
In non-ownership states, under the rule of capture, oil and gas be-
come personal property once severed from the soil and captured:88
[N]o person owns oil and gas until it is produced and
any person may "capture" the oil and gas if able to do
so. Of course one may not go upon the land of another
to effect the capture, so it is necessary to have such an
interest in the land upon which a well is drilled for the
purpose of capturing the fugitive minerals as will author-
ize the drilling of the well. 89
A minority of states-including New York, California, and Ohio-
have adopted the non-ownership theory.90 As this theory stems from the
rule of capture-and is essentially the only way a landowner may reduce
oil and gas to possession-each state subscribing to the non-ownership
83 See, e.g., Triger v. Carter Oil Co., 23 N.E.2d 55, 56 (Ill. 1939) ("[Olil and gas in place
are minerals but by reason of their fugacious qualities they are incapable of ownership distinct
from the soil. They belong to the owner of the land only so long as they remain under the
land.").
84 Michelle D. Baldwin, Note, Ownership of Coalbed Methane Gas: Recent Develop-
ments in Case Law, 100 W. VA. L. REV. 673, 676 (1998) (quoting J. THOMAS LANE, COAL,
ORL AND GAS 29, 30 (1996)).
85 Transcon. Oil Co. v. Emmerson, 131 N.E. 645, 649 (Ill. 1921).
86 See LowE, supra note 38, at 31.
87 NCNB Tex. Nat'l Bank, N.A. v. West, 631 So. 2d 212, 223 (Ala. 1993) (quoting Sun
Oil Co. v. Oswell, 62 So. 2d 783, 787 (Ala. 1953)); see La. Land & Exploration Co. v. Don-
nelly, 394 F.2d 273, 276 (5th Cir. 1968) ("[P]roperty interest [in oil and gas] is the right to
reduce the minerals to possession.").
88 See WILLIAMS & MEYERs, supra note 32, § 203.1.
89 Id.
90 See id. § 203. In some states, the non-ownership theory is adopted through the courts'
interpretation of ownership rights; in others, such as Louisiana, state legislatures have enacted
statutes adopting the doctrine. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:5 (2000).
2011]1 469
470 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 21:457
theory also recognizes the rule of capture.91 Furthermore, non-owner-
ship jurisdictions protect the correlative rights of landowners who have
an interest in a common reservoir.92 In Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana,93 the
Supreme Court opined that while the public at large does not have an
interest in a common reservoir underlying the lands of a limited group of
landowners, these landowners are "collective owners" of the oil and gas
and each has a "coequal right . . . to take from [the] common source of
supply."94 The Court confirmed the power of the legislature to protect
common property and prevent economic waste.95
III. A LEGAL REMEDY: SUBSURFACE TRESPASS
Though the rule of capture limits landowners' legal rights against
other landowners who extract oil and gas from common reservoirs, the
process of hydraulic fracturing may differ from other drilling processes
and therefore provide for alternative theories of liability. Various courts
and legal scholars suggest that subsurface trespass, conversion, private
nuisance, and negligence may provide theories of liability and relief to
landowners who do not consent to the hydraulic fracturing of their min-
eral estates. 96 This Note focuses exclusively on subsurface trespass. As
previously discussed, the rule of capture shields liability for drainage
from a common reservoir unless an improper means of extraction is used
or the extracting landowner commits waste97; trespass is such an im-
proper means.
A. Trespass
The common law tort definition of trespass is "an unauthorized and
direct breach of the boundaries of another's land."98 The trespass must
be a physical invasion.99 Trespassers are liable where the "intrusion has
been intentional, negligent, or the result of an abnormally dangerous ac-
tivity in which he is engaged."'" Notably, the trespasser's intended re-
91 See WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 32, § 203.1.
92 E.g., Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 209-10 (1900).
93 Id.
94 Id. at 209-10.
95 Id. at 210.
96 See, e.g., Ragsdale, supra note 31, at 341-47.
9' See supra Section II.A.1.
98 Burney & Hyne, supra note 7, § 19.03.
99 See Villarreal v. Grant Geophysical, Inc., 136 S.W.3d 265, 268-69 (Tex. App. 2004)
(holding the acquisition of geophysical data through three-dimensional testing does not consti-
tute trespass because no physical invasion occurred).
100 Burney & Hyne, supra note 7, § 19.03 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 329 (1965)).
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sult is unimportant under tort law. 101 Landownership bestows both rights
and duties on landowners.102 Each "landowner has a legal right that
others shall not enter on or harm the land or take or interfere with the oil
and gas under the land by operations conducted on the land."' 0 3 Argua-
bly, drilling directional wells and injecting fluids for secondary recovery
operations (like the hydraulic fracturing process itself) interferes with
landowners' property rights.104 In application, "the incursion of hydrau-
lic fracturing fluid and proppants into another's land . . . below the sur-
face constitutes a trespass for which the minerals owner can recover
damages equal to the value of the royalty on the gas thereby drained
from the land." 0 5 Hydraulic fracturing operations on one estate may
involve fracturing and injecting frac fluid into the subsurface estate of
adjoining landowners. 10 6
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FIGURE 1: ILLUSTRATION OF HYDRAULIC FRACTURING AND SUBSUR-
FACE TRESPASS. Modified from MARYLAND GEOLOGICAL SURVEY,
Marcellus Shale and Natural Gas in Western Maryland, http://
www.mgs.md.gov/geo/marcellus.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2011).
101 See Eduardo M. Pefialver, Professor of Law, Cornell Law School, Remarks at the
Cornell Law School 2011 Energy Conference: Gas Drilling, Sustainability & Energy Policy
(Apr. 2, 2011), http://streams.lawschool.cornell.edu/mediasite/Viewer/?peid=48442bc606ca4e
ddb47b32bdaae657e6 Id.
102 See id.
103 1 W.L. SUMMERS, OIL AND GAS § 2.1 (3d ed. 2004).
104 See Burney & Hyne, supra note 7, §19.03.
105 Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 9 (Tex. 2008).
106 See id.
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Figure 1 illustrates two possible trespass claims that could result
from a hydraulic fracturing operation. 0 7 First, trespass may occur when
the drill enters the adjoining landowner's property via slant or directional
drilling. Second, when frac fluid is injected and pressure applied, the
frac fluid may enter and cause fractures in the adjoining landowner's
subsurface mineral estate: here the entry of the frac fluid may constitute
trespass. Because modern surveying and fracturing technology allow
drillers to measure and predict the volume, length, and direction of the
fracture,' 08 courts may find a resulting subsurface trespass occurred in-
tentionally or negligently. 109
B. Subsurface Trespass Caused by Hydraulic Fracturing
Although the physical elements of a trespass may be present, some
courts-often for policy reasons-are reluctant to find an actionable tres-
pass." 0 Without an actionable trespass claim, claimants are unable to
recover regardless of whether the trespass was caused intentionally or
negligently, or whether the landowner sustained damages."'
In the seminal case Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy
Trust,112 the Texas Supreme Court was asked to address "whether sub-
surface hydraulic fracturing of a natural gas well that extends into an-
other's property is a trespass for which the value of gas drained as a
result may be recovered as damages."" 3 In this case, mineral estate
lessee Coastal Oil & Gas Corporation (Coastal) drilled a well only 467
feet from the adjoining property which belonged to respondents.114
Coastal engineers designed the frac job to reach over 1,000 feet from the
Coastal well." 5  Respondents brought an action claiming subsurface
trespass and resultant loss of mineral royalties."' 6 The parties agreed that
the hydraulic and propped lengths exceeded Coastal's property boundary
but disagreed as to whether the effective length did."' 7 The court ulti-
mately ruled on a peripheral standing issue and did not decide the tres-
107 See supra Figure 1 for an illustration of subsurface trespass resulting from hydraulic
fracturing.
108 See Kappel, supra note 19.
109 Although subsurface trespass may occur unintentionally, intent and negligence are rel-
evant to the determination of recoverable damages. See EUGENE KUNTz, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 11.9 (1993).
110 See Coastal, 268 S.W.3d at 9.
111 See id.
112 268 S.W.3d I (Tex. 2008).
113 Id. at 4.
114 Id. at 6.
115 Id. at 7.
116 Id.
117 Id.
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pass issue.' 18 However, in dicta, the court noted that the rule of capture
precluded recovery in this case.' 19 Engineers anticipated with near cer-
tainty that the fluids would travel under respondents' property, and the
parties agreed that fluids had likely crossed boundary lines. 120 Despite
this record, the court applied the rule of capture:
[The rule of capture] gives a mineral rights owner title to
the oil and gas produced from a lawful well bottomed on
the property, even if the oil and gas flowed to the well
from beneath another owner's tract. The rule of capture
is a cornerstone of the oil and gas industry and is funda-
mental both to property rights and to state regulation. 121
The court provided four reasons why the rule of capture, rather than
trespass, governs hydraulic fracturing:
First, the law already affords the owner who claims
drainage full recourse. This is the justification for the
rule of capture, and it applies regardless of whether the
drainage is due to fracing ....
Second, allowing recovery for the value of gas
drained by hydraulic fracturing . . . assumes that the gas
belongs to the owner of the minerals in the drained prop-
erty, contrary to the rule of capture ....
Third, determining the value of oil and gas drained
by hydraulic fracturing is the kind of issue the litigation
process is least equipped to handle. One difficulty is
that the material facts are hidden below miles of rock,
making it difficult to ascertain what might have hap-
pened. Such difficulty in proof is one of the justifica-
tions for the rule of capture . ...
Fourth, the law of capture should not be changed to
apply differently to hydraulic fracturing because no one
in the industry appears to want or need the change.122
The third and fourth reasons that the court gives suggest that the political
strength of the oil and gas industry in Texas and public policy favoring
this industry motivated the court's rationale.123 The court found both
that hydraulic fracturing was "essential," not "optional," to the recovery
of oil and gas, and that it could not be performed to both maximize com-
118 See id. at 12-13.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 7.
121 Id. at 13.
122 Id. at 14-16.
123 See id. at 16-17.
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mercial effectiveness and at the same time minimize drainage. 124 Con-
trary to these assertions, proof of fracture is available and records
documenting surveys of the fracture are even required in some states.125
While surveying and predicting the length and volume of fractures was
difficult and inaccurate when hydraulic fracturing was first adopted,
modem technology makes these predictions more accessible, accurate,
and affordable.12 6
In crafting its analysis .in favor of Texas public policy, the Coastal
Oil & Gas Corp. court improperly applied the rule of capture. The rule
of capture does not function to shield against all liability for gas recov-
ered from a common reservoir.12 7 As Justice Johnson noted in his partial
dissent: "The rule of capture precludes liability for capturing oil or gas
drained from a neighboring property 'whenever such flow occurs solely
through the operation of natural agencies in a normal manner, as distin-
guished from artificial means applied to stimulate such a flow."128
Where a trespass enables the capture of oil or gas, the rule of capture
does not apply and the capturer is liable for trespass to the aggrieved
landowner.12 9
IV. ANALOGICALLY SIMILAR PROCESSES
Due to the relatively recent introduction of hydraulic fracturing to
the Marcellus Shale region, the most relevant precedent comes from
Texas and other oil producing states.130 If states in the Marcellus Shale
124 Id.
125 See SUMMERS, supra note 103, § 2.2 ("In some oil-producing states, the regulations of
conservation agencies require producers to make directional surveys of wells and to preserve
records of these surveys. By using this information, a landowner or lessee can discover if land
has been subject to subsurface trespass by adjoining owners through directional or slant
drilling.").
126 See id.; Kappel, supra note 19.
127 See Coastal Oil, 268 S.W.3d at 17 ("It should go without saying that the rule of
capture cannot be used to shield misconduct that is illegal, malicious, reckless, or intended to
harm another without commercial justification, should such a case ever arise.").
128 Id. at 42 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (quoting Peterson v. Grayce Oil Co., 37 S.W.2d 367,
370-71 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931), affid, 98 S.W.2d 781 (Tex. 1936)).
129 See Pefialver, supra note 101. Alluding to Pierson v. Post (3 Cai. 175, 177-78 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1805)), Professor Pefialver suggests that the rule of capture should apply to hydraulic
fracturing just as it would to wild animals: the rule of capture does not shield a hunter from
liability for shooting a deer while on his neighbor's property. Trespass law would apply and
the capture would be wrongful conversion. See id.
130 See John W. Broomes, Wrestling with a Downhole Dilemma: Subsurface Trespass,
Correlative Rights, and the Need for Hydraulic Fracturing in Tight Reservoirs, 53 ROCKY
MrN. MIN. L. INST. §§ 20.01-20.02 (2007) (identifying Texas as the first state to recognize
hydraulic fracturing as a potential trespass). Note that Texas subscribes to the ownership-in-
place doctrine. Therefore, application of the rule of capture may (and arguably should) vary
from that of non-ownership jurisdictions such as New York. See supra Section II.B for a
discussion of the ownership-in-place doctrine.
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region apply and interpret trespass law similarly to Texas and other tradi-
tional oil producing states, courts likely will not find an actionable tres-
pass.' 3 ' However, as of yet, there is no case law in the Marcellus Shale
region specifically holding in favor or against a hydraulic fracture sub-
surface trespass claim. The lack of legal precedent leaves New York
state courts free to apply historical ownership theories, to interpret statu-
tory laws and public policy, and to analogize hydraulic fracturing with
other processes that courts have found constitute actionable trespass
claims.
Thus, New York courts may review de novo the issues that hydrau-
lic fracturing implicates-including how to treat the effects of such drill-
ing. In examining property rights, courts should consider processes that
are analogically similar to hydraulic fracturing such as slant drilling or
directionally drilled wells, the injection of fluids for secondary recovery
and storage operations, and the extension of underground coal mine
seams.
A. Directional Drilling
Directional drilling, also referred to as slant drilling, has long been
held a clear example of subsurface trespass.132 Directional drilling oc-
curs when a well is drilled on the surface of the landowner's property
and either intentionally or inadvertently deviates from a vertical line and
bottoms on an adjoining landowner's property.' 33 Courts uniformly have
held that because directional drilling involves an unauthorized, direct,
and physical intrusion, an actionable trespass exists.134 Any oil or gas
produced from such a "slant drilled" well was obtained through conver-
sion and the trespasser-tortfeasor is generally liable for the value of the
oil or gas produced.' 35 Where the trespass is committed in good faith,
liability is "subject to a deduction for the reasonable costs of
production."l 3 6
Although no court directly has held that hydraulic fracturing
presents an actionable subsurface trespass, several courts have analo-
gized the process to directional drilling.'37 In 1961 in Gregg v. Delhi-
131 See Coastal Oil, 268 S.W.3d at 41 (Willett, J., concurring) (concluding that courts
should avoid permitting trespass liability in an oil-producing state like Texas because it would
cause "real and acute" dampening effects on the economy).
132 See Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v Orr, 319 F.2d. 612, 612 (5th Cir. 1963); Hastings Oil
Co. v. Tex. Co., 234 S.W.2d 389, 390-91 (Tex. 1950).
133 See Summers, supra note 103, § 2.3.
134 See KuNT-z, supra note 109, § 11.9; SUMMERS, supra note 103, § 2.3.
135 Broomes, supra note 131, § 20.03.
136 Id.
137 See Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 13-15 (Tex.
2008); Gregg v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp., 337 S.W.2d 216, 221 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960), affd,
344 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. 1961).
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Taylor Oil Corp.,138 the Texas Supreme Court compared the claimed hy-
draulic fracture trespass to one resulting from slant drilling. 139 While in
this case, as in most hydraulic fracturing subsurface trespass cases, the
drill bit was not alleged to have entered the land of the non-consenting
landowner, the court determined that "the same result is reached if in fact
the cracks or veins extend into its land and gas is produced there-
from . ... "140 While the court did not determine whether the alleged
trespass constituted subsurface trespass, 141 this case demonstrates the an-
alytical and physical similarities between directional drilling and hydrau-
lic fracturing.14 2
For over thirty years, Gregg "stood as the only reported judicial
pronouncement on hydraulic fracture subsurface trespass." 43 Finally, in
the monumental Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. case in 2008,1" the Supreme
Court of Texas addressed in dicta whether "hydraulic fracturing that ex-
tends beyond one's property is . . . different from drilling a deviated or
slant well."l 45 The court explicitly rejected the possible analogy between
slant drilling and hydraulic fracturing.' 46 In explaining the rationale for
application of the rule of capture, the court remarked that the each land-
owner's ability to drill her own well to protect against drainage mitigated
the risks that the application of the rule presented.147 The court com-
pared slant drilling and hydraulic fracturing, stating:
The gas produced through a deviated well does not mi-
grate to the wellbore from another's property; it is al-
ready on another's property. The rule of capture is
justified because a landowner can protect himself from
drainage by drilling his own well, thereby avoiding the
uncertainties of determining how gas is migrating
through a reservoir. It is a rule of expedience. One can-
not protect against drainage from a deviated well by
drilling his own well; the deviated well will continue to
produce his gas. Nor is there any uncertainty that a devi-
ated well is producing another owner's gas. The justifi-
138 344 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. 1961).
139 See id. at 414-17.
140 Id. at 416.
141 Id. at 417. The primary issue in this case was jurisdiction. See id. at 416-17.
142 Id. at 414-17.
143 Ragsdale, supra note 31, at 340.
144 Coastal Oil & Gas Corp v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 13 (Tex. 2008).
145 Id. at 13.
146 Id. at 13-14.
147 See id.
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cations for the rule of capture do not support applying
the rule to a deviated well.14 8
Here, the court misconstrued what should have been a sequential analy-
sis. Rather than looking at whether the rule of capture applied, the court
first should have looked at whether a trespass occurred. Justice John-
son's partial dissent recognizes this logical fallacy and notes several rea-
sons why slant drilling and hydraulic fracturing are analogous.14 9 First,
"both involve a lease operator's intentional actions which result in in-
serting foreign materials without permission into a second lease."' 50
Second, both techniques use foreign materials-either the drill bit in the
case of slant drilling and frac fluid and proppants in the case of hydraulic
fracturing-to drain minerals.' 5 Finally, Justice Johnson noted that both
slant drilling and hydraulic fracturing result in "capturing" minerals from
the first lease.15 2
The current state of subsurface trespass and hydraulic fracturing law
in Texas and other longtime commercial oil and gas producing states is
indeterminate. Although Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. suggests that subsur-
face invasion by hydraulic fracturing fluids does not constitute an action-
able trespass, the court's reasoning is weak, and other cases suggest that
an actionable trespass claim does exist.'5 3 Furthermore, history, out-
dated technology, and public policy, rather than legal doctrine, play an
overbearing role in the court's decision. 154 States in the Marcellus Shale
region should adopt policies and laws that reflect currently available
technology and the prevailing public policy of the area. Although the
partial dissent directly addresses the technical elements of both
processes, the majority fails to examine the merits of the case and bla-
tantly engages in "results oriented judging," finding in favor of Texas
public policy of encouraging oil and gas production at the cost of indi-
vidual land rights. 55
148 Id. at 14 (citations omitted).
149 See id. at 44 (Johnson, J., dissenting); Ragsdale, supra note 31, at 339 ("From both a
functional and physical perspective, a hydraulic fracture is largely analogous to a directionally
drilled well.").
150 Coastal Oil, 268 S.W.3d at 44 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 See id.; Geo Viking, Inc. v. Tex-Lee Operating Co., No. D-1678, 1992 WL 80263, at
*2 (Apr. 22, 1992), withdrawn and superseded, 839 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. 1992); Delhi-Taylor Oil
Corp. v. Gregg, 337 S.W.2d 216, 220 (Tex. App. 1960), affd, 344 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. 1961).
154 See Coastal Oil, 268 S.W.3d at 16-17.
155 See Pefialver, supra note 101.
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B. Secondary Recovery and Storage Operations
Case law involving the injection of fluids into the ground for secon-
dary recovery and storage operations provides a spectrum of decisions
related to the law of subsurface trespass.156 Here-as in the analogy to
slant drilling-public policy, support for the oil and gas industry, and
increasing demand for inexpensive oil and gas heavily influence and
guide courts' analyses and decisions.157
The process of fluid injection bears many similarities to hydraulic
fracturing.s58 Subsurface entry of injected fluids typically occurs during:
"(1) ... an enhanced recovery operation 'to sweep' hydrocarbons toward
producing wells, thereby recovering reserves incremental to primary re-
covery; (2) pumping salt water into a well to inexpensively dispose of
'waste' fluids in a salt water formation; and (3) injecting natural gas into
an underground storage."l 59 These processes are similar to hydraulic
fracturing where frac fluids and proppants are pumped into the
ground.' 60 In both situations, it is possible for injected fluids to flow
from the injection well into the adjoining subsurface property, amounting
to a subsurface trespass.' 6 1 As such, "courts have been asked to enjoin
water-flooding projects" and other similar processes "on the basis that
the injected water will sweep across lease or unit lines, resulting in an
impermissible trespass." 62
In Jameson v. Ethyl Corp.,163 the Arkansas Supreme Court ad-
dressed whether trespass law, the rule of capture, or nuisance law gov-
erned a situation where brine pumped into the ground for secondary
recovery purposes caused the movement of bromide from a neighboring
tract onto the well operator's lease.IM The Jameson court balanced pub-
lic policy, correlative rights, and the rule of capture.165 The court
explained:
156 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Stryker, 723 So. 2d 585, 588-89 (Ala. 1998); Baumgart-
ner v. Gulf Oil Corp., 168 N.W.2d 510, 516 (Neb. 1969) ("[W]here a secondary recovery
project has been authorized by the commission the operator is not liable for willful trespass to
owners who refused to join the project when the injected recovery substance moves across
lease lines."); R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Manziel, 361 S.W.2d 560, 568-69 (Tex. 1962) (deny-
ing claim of subsurface trespass in favor of correlative rights and public policy).
157 See Ragsdale, supra note 31, at 335 ("Due to strong public policies of promoting these
types of operations, courts have been cautious in finding liability for injected fluid subsurface
entries and in fashioning remedies.").
158 Id. at 339.
159 Id. at 335.
160 See N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, Marcellus Shale, supra
note 1.
161 See Ragsdale, supra note 31, at 335.
162 Burney & Hyne, supra note 7, § 19.03.
163 609 S.W.2d 346 (Ark. 1980).
164 See id. at 347-49.
165 See Burney & Hyne, supra note 7, § 19.03.
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A determination that a trespass or nuisance occurs
through secondary recovery processes within a recovery
area would tend to promote waste of such natural re-
sources and extend unwarranted bargaining power to mi-
nority landowners. On the other hand, a determination
that the rule of capture should be expanded to cover the
present situation could unnecessarily extend the license
of mineral extraction companies to appropriate minerals
which might be induced to be moved from other proper-
ties through such processes and, in any event, further ex-
tend the bargaining power of such entities to reduce
royalty payments to landowners who are financially una-
ble to 'go and do likewise.' 66
The court's commentary demonstrates the influence of policy considera-
tions upon judicial decision-making. Although the court remanded the
case, not directly addressing whether a trespass occurred, the court did
limit application of the rule of capture:
By adopting an interpretation that the rule of capture
should not be extended insofar as operations relate to
lands lying within the peripheral area affected, we, how-
ever, are holding that reasonable and necessary secon-
dary recovery processes of pools of transient materials
should be permitted, when such operations are carried
out in good faith for the purpose of maximizing recovery
from a common pool.1 67
Though other courts have engaged in similar analyses, they have
reached vastly different conclusions.' 68 For example, in Baumgartner v.
Gulf Oil Corp.,169 the Nebraska Supreme Court weighed public policy in
support of increasing oil and gas production against the property rights of
individual landowners and found in favor of oil and gas production.o70
Specifically, the court stated:
Certainly, it is relevant to consider and weigh the inter-
ests of society and the oil and gas industry as a whole
against the interests of the individual operator who is
damaged; and if the authorized activities in an adjoining
secondary recovery unit are found to be based on some
166 Jameson, 609 S.W.2d at 351.
167 Id.
168 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Stryker, 723 So. 2d 585, 588-89 (Ala. 1998); Baumgart-
ner v. Gulf Oil Corp., 168 N.W.2d 510, 516 (Neb. 1969); R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Manziel,
361 S.W.2d 560, 568-69 (Tex. 1962).
169 168 N.W.2d 510 (Neb. 1969).
170 See id. at 517.
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substantial, justifying occasion, then this court should
sustain their validity.
We conclude that if, in the valid exercise of its au-
thority to prevent waste, protect correlative rights, or in
the exercise of other powers within its jurisdiction, the
Commission authorizes secondary recovery projects, a
trespass does not occur when the injected, secondary re-
covery forces move across lease lines, and the operations
are not subject to an injunction on that basis. The tech-
nical rules of trespass have no place in the consideration
of the validity of the orders of the Commission.171
Here, as in Coastal Oil & Gas Corp., the court identified the elements of
subsurface trespass and yet refused to find a legally actionable claim.172
The court adopted an outcome-centered analysis that it justified through
application of the correlative rights doctrine. 173 Arguably, such a policy-
driven decision is best left to state legislatures because state legislatures
can adopt compulsory integration statutes that advance a similar policy
while also correctly applying legal doctrines.
The role of public policy in existing legal precedent suggests that
courts in New York and other Marcellus Shale region states also will
interpret state laws in a manner that defers to public policy.1 7 4 New
York's Environmental Conservation Law § 23-0301 promotes a public
policy that protects landowners' individual property rights while also en-
couraging natural gas production.' 75 The statute states:
It is hereby declared to be in the public interest to
regulate the development, production and utilization of
natural resources of oil and gas in this state in such a
manner as will prevent waste; to authorize and to pro-
vide for the operation and development of oil and gas
properties in such a manner that a greater ultimate recov-
ery of oil and gas may be had, and that the correlative
rights of all owners and the rights of all persons includ-
ing landowners and the general public may be fully pro-
tected, and to provide in similar fashion for the
underground storage of gas, the solution mining of salt
and geothermal, stratigraphic and brine disposal
wells. 176
171 Id.
172 See Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 17 (Tex. 2008).
173 See Baumgartner, 168 N.W.2d at 516-17.
174 See id.
175 See N.Y. ENvrL. CONSERV. LAW § 23-0301 (McKinney 2007).
176 Id.
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As written, § 23-0301 can be interpreted to protect individual land-
owner's property rights.177 Moreover, public concern and political ac-
tion opposed to hydraulic fracturing may sway New York state courts to
interpret the rule of capture to find an actionable trespass.17 8 In 2010, the
state legislature passed a bill which provided for a temporary moratorium
on new drilling permits.17 9 Although the bill was vetoed by then-Gover-
nor David Paterson, the Governor issued an executive order banning all
high-impact drilling until the Department of Environmental Conservation
fully evaluated the fracturing process and its impacts.180 If § 23-0301
and the recent legislative and executive actions accurately represent New
York public policy, New York state courts may interpret the statute to
provide legal remedies against trespass via fluid injection and hydraulic
fracturing.
C. Coal and Coalbed Methane Gas
Hydraulic fracturing yields physical results distinct from those
caused by traditional forms of oil and gas drilling.' 8 ' Fracturing the
shale frees oil and gas previously trapped within the shale, allowing it to
migrate to the well.182 Where a well bore or frac fluids cross a boundary
line into an adjacent property, causing a fracture in the subsurface shale
of the adjacent property, it is the fracture-an action of trespass-that
causes oil or gas trapped within the adjacent property to become fuga-
cious.18 3 Conversely, other drilling processes generally involve acces-
sing a common underground pool where the gas is already free to
migrate within the pool and across property lines.' 84 This key distinction
makes hydraulic fracturing different from other drilling processes. This
distinction was illuminated in Coastal Oil & Gas Corp.18  There, Justice
Johnson's partial dissent asserted that the rule of capture applies only to
gas which flows naturally between property lines:
177 See id.
178 See Assemb. 11443, 2010 Leg., 233rd Sess. (N.Y. 2010), available at http://assembly.
state.ny.usleg/?default fld=&bn=A I 443&term=2009&Summary=Y&Text=Y.
179 See id.
180 Exec. Order No. 41, 33 N.Y. Reg. 99 (2011), available at http://www.dos.state.ny.us/
info/register/201 1/jan 12/pdfs/execorders.pdf.
181 See N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, Marcellus Shale, supra
note 1.
182 See Bumey & Hyne, supra note 7, § 19.02.
183 See Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 44 (Tex. 2008)
(Willett, J., concurring); Burney & Hyne, supra note 7, § 19.03 ("Under both common law and
modem definitions, a trespass occurs if a 'thing' physically crosses property boundaries . . . .
[T]his definition is satisfied when fracing extends beyond lease or unit lines since fracing
inevitably involves a direct, physical intrusion of the pad and propping fluids into the adjoin-
ing neighbor's property.").
184 See Coastal Oil, 268 S.W.3d. at 14.
185 See id.
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The rule of capture precludes liability for capturing oil
or gas drained from a neighboring property "whenever
such flow occurs solely through the operation of natural
agencies in a normal manner, as distinguished from arti-
ficial means applied to stimulate such a flow." The ra-
tionale for the rule of capture is the "fugitive nature" of
hydrocarbons. They flow to places of lesser pressure
and do not respect property lines .... I would not apply
the rule to a situation such as this in which a party effec-
tively enters another's lease without consent, drains min-
erals by means of an artificially created channel or
device, and then "captures" the minerals on the tres-
passer's lease.1 86
In evaluating the purpose and results of hydraulic fracturing, the
legislatures and courts of New York and other Marcellus Shale region
states should consider adopting a doctrine that fully accounts for the na-
ture of the shale and gas prior to fracture. Because the gas is trapped and
non-migratory prior to fracture, gas in the Marcellus Shale is more simi-
lar to a solid mineral than fugacious oil or gas.s187 In examining similar
physical processes, both the extension of coal mine seams onto neighbor-
ing property and the application of the theories of ownership over
coalbed methane released during mining operations provide useful
comparisons. 8 8
1. Coal
The rule of capture does not govern ownership of solid minerals. 89
Rather, the ownership-in-place and the non-ownership theories establish
ownership rights over solid minerals.190 In the case of solid minerals,
such as coal, determining whether a trespass has occurred is relatively
straightforward.191 As the California Court of Appeal noted: "A person
entering within the side lines of the mining claim of another for the pur-
pose of mining the same is prima facie a trespasser." 19 2 In another case,
the California Supreme Court held that an unlawful trespass occurred
where "[d]efendants sunk a shaft in their own mine . . . about 290 feet
from plaintiffs line, and by means of crosscuts therefrom to the vein and
186 Id. at 42-43 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (quoting Peterson v. Grayce Oil Co., 37 S.W.2d
367, 370-71 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931), affd, 98 S.W.2d 781 (Tex. 1936)).
187 See LowE, supra note 38, at 29-30.
188 See infra Section IV.c for a discussion of coalbed methane extraction.
189 See LowE, supra note 38, at 29-30.
190 Id. See supra Sections I.b and II.c for a discussion of the ownership-in-place and
non-ownership theories.
191 See Flagstaff Silver Mining Co. of Utah v. Tarbet, 98 U.S. 463, 465-66 (1878).
192 Wm. H. Hoegee Inv. Co. v. Burton Bros., 283 P.2d 314, 317 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955).
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drifts therein beneath the surface of the plaintiffs boundaries, they
secretly, knowingly, and willfully took from plaintiffs mine ore."l 93
Moreover, while many of the relevant coal mining cases were de-
cided in the early 1900s-a period of high coal demand and use-courts
did not bow to claims of necessity, public utility, or driller-error.19 4 In
Donovan v. Consolidated Coal Co.,195 the plaintiff sued to recover for
damages for trespass on coal deposits. 196 The defendant argued that be-
cause the trespass was not "willful," the court should award damages in
the amount of the value of the coal while in the ground decreased by the
cost of extraction.'9 7 Taking a hardline approach, the court determined
that the trespass was caused by the defendant's negligence and thus the
damages were in the amount of the value of the coal.19 8 The court did
not allow any reduction in the judgment for the cost of extracting the
coal.199 The court specifically held:
No necessity exists for one miner to trespass upon an
adjoining owner. If proper maps and plans of the mine
are kept and measurements and surveys of the work
made, as required by common prudence and the statute,
each miner will have no difficulty in confining his oper-
ations to his own estate. When, therefore, one miner, in
disregard of his duty, invades the property of another, he
should not be permitted to profit by his unlawful
act . . . .200
The court's analytically accurate application of basic trespass law to coal
and coal mining suggests that, despite inevitable public policy pressures,
courts are able to distinguish between policy and law. 2 0 1
2. Coalbed Methane Gas
Although now considered a valuable resource, until the 1930s
coalbed methane gas was thought to be merely a dangerous nuisance.202
Coalbed methane is a result of:
193 Lightner Mining Co. v. Lane, 120 P. 771, 776 (Cal. 1911).
194 See id.; Donovan v. Consol. Coal Co., 58 N.E. 290, 291-92 (111. 1900).
195 58 N.E. 290 (Ill. 1900).
196 See id. at 290-91.
197 Id. at 291.
198 Id.
'99 Id.
200 Id. at 291-92.
201 See id.
202 See Ronald K. Olson, Coalbed Methane: Legal Considerations Affecting Its Develop-
ment as an Energy Resource, 13 TULSA L.J. 377, 379-80 (1978) ("The ignition of accumulated
methane causes most mine explosions.").
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[B]iochemical and bacterial transformation that occurs
during the peat state of coal deposition and subsequently
by metamorphic processes as buried peat increases in
rank to become coal. Because of the fine pore structure
of coal and degraded peat, sorptive capacities of such
substance are very large so that much of the methane
evolved during coalification is held in the peat and in the
coal.
As a coal seam is mined, the methane migrates to the
face of the mining operation and is released into the
air.203
Release of the methane is dependent on some physical act which changes
the natural containment of the gas.2 0 4 The effective containment of
coalbed methane is very similar to that of the gas caught in the pores of
shale. 205 Since ownership or a similar property interest is requisite to
establish a claim of injury, such as trespass or conversion, the similarities
between coalbed methane and shale gas make courts' discussion of own-
ership of coalbed methane gas particularly relevant. 206
When miners discovered that capturing coalbed methane was possi-
ble on a large scale, courts were charged with determining who owned
the escaped gas. 2 0 7 The first major case to address coalbed methane gas
ownership, United States Steel Corp. v. Hoge,208 arose in Pennsylvania,
an ownership-in-place state. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania char-
acterized methane gas ownership in clear ownership-in-place terms:
The fact that gas is of a fugacious character does not
prevent ownership in it from being granted prior to its
being reduced to possession . . . . Gas is a mineral,
though not commonly spoken of as such, and while in
place it is part of the property in which it is contained, as
is the case with other minerals within the bounds of a
freehold estate.209
Following this application of the ownership-in-place theory, the court
specifically applied the ownership-in-place doctrine to methane gas:
203 Id. at 379-80 (internal citations omitted).
204 See id. at 379.
205 See Burney & Hyne, supra note 7, § 19.02.
206 See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Hoge, 468 A.2d 1380, 1383-84 (Pa. 1983). This Note will not
address trespass of methane gas reserves due to a lack of case law addressing the topic.
207 See Carbon County v. Union Reserve Coal Co., Inc., 898 P.2d 680, 686-87 (Mont.
1995) (applying the ownership-in-place doctrine to methane gas in Montana); see also WiL-
LIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 32, § 203.
208 U.S. Steel Corp., 468 A.2d at 1383-84.
209 Id. at 1383.
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[Slubterranean gas is owned by whoever has title to the
property in which the gas is resting .... In accordance
with the foregoing principles governing gas ownership,
therefore, such gas as is present in coal must necessarily
belong to the owner of the coal, so long as it remains
within his property and subject to his exclusive domin-
ion and control. 210
Thus, the ownership-in-place theory applies to coalbed methane gas in
the same way that it applies to other fugitive resources. 211
Non-ownership states recognize the exclusive right of coal owners
to produce coalbed methane gas. 2 12 The Alabama Supreme Court has
twice addressed coalbed methane gas ownership in connection with the
non-ownership theory.213 First, in Vines v. McKenzie Methane Corp.,214
while interpreting the plain meaning of the term "other minerals" in a
lease granting rights to coal and other minerals, 215 the court held that
"the ownership of methane gas, with the accompanying rights to drill for
this substance, was necessarily included" in the lease. 2 16 In the same
year, the court decided NCNB Texas National Bank v. West,2 1 7 wherein
the Alabama Supreme Court further explained that:
The nonownership [sic] theory of gas ownership, be-
cause it recognizes the migratory nature of oil and gas,
requires actual possession to establish ownership of the
resource, and the right held by the landowner is "the
right to reduce the oil and gas to possession or to sever
this right for economic consideration." 21s
In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that methane gas should not
be "treated as a resource separate and distinct from other natural gas." 2 19
210 Id.
211 See id.; WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 32, § 203.
212 See Vines v. McKenzie Methane Corp., 619 So. 2d 1305, 1308-09 (Ala. 1993) (per
curiam).
213 See id.; see also NCNB Tex. Nat'l Bank v. West, 631 So. 2d 212, 223-24 (Ala. 1993)
(per curiam).
214 619 So. 2d 1305 (Ala. 1993) (per curiam).
215 Id. at 1306.
216 Id. at 1309.
217 631 So. 2d 212 (Ala. 1993).
218 Id. at 223 (quoting Sun Oil Co. v. Oswell, 62 So. 2d 783, 787 (Ala. 1953)).
219 Id. at 222. The court stated:
We can find no scientific or legal basis to support the proposition that coalbed meth-
ane gas should be treated as a resource separate and distinct from other natural gas,
or from any other gas. The fact that the coalbed methane gas is produced by, and
stored within, coal seams does not require the conclusion that a grant of "all coal"
includes coalbed methane gas, nor does it require the conclusion that a reservation of
"all gas" does not include coalbed methane gas. As we said in Turner v. Lassiter,
"Under the facts of this case: 'All' is all. 'All' is not ambiguous. 'All' is not vague.
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Drawn to its logical conclusion, this assumption suggests that non-own-
ership states likely will determine that shale bed gas is not separate or
distinct from other natural gas, therefore requiring actual possession to
establish ownership. 220 This assumption presumes that even where arti-
ficial means are used to stimulate the flow of gas to facilitate extraction,
the coalbed owner has no claim of trespass or conversion as to gas not in
physical possession if the gas is captured and extracted by another
individual.
In sum, both the ownership-in-place and non-ownership theories
provide that absent intentional severance, a person with a property inter-
est in the coalbed also has an interest in the coalbed methane gas.2 2 1
Although states seem to interpret the ownership theories differently, one
thing is clear: the characterization of methane gas as a conventional gas
greatly affects the outcome of any ownership analysis.222
CONCLUSION
The use of hydraulic fracturing to extract natural gas is worth con-
sideration in light of its potential to facilitate the efficient and profitable
extraction of natural gas resources, the development of clean and sustain-
able energy sources, and the expansion of community employment and
industry. 223 However, as the use of hydraulic fracturing expands into
states lacking substantial experience in the production of oil and gas,
such as the Marcellus Shale region, the rule of capture and laws concern-
ing trespass should be interpreted to reflect and account for legal prece-
dent, the expansion of new, advanced technologies, and regional public
policy.
The unique nature of natural gas found in the Marcellus Shale and
New York public policy suggest that laws regarding hydraulic fracturing
and subsurface trespass in this region should not mirror the laws of Texas
and other oil and gas producing states.224 Reflecting local public policy
and related analysis, New York should adopt a more scientifically accu-
rate legal analysis. 22 5 The development of new technologies has made
hydraulic fracturing a cost effective and efficient means of extracting gas
'All' is not of doubtful meaning." However, careful analysis of the law of real prop-
erty indicates that the ownership of coalbed gas depends upon its location at the time
the gas is recovered or "captured," at which time it is reduced to possession.
Id. at 222-23 (quoting Turner v. Lassiter, 484 So. 2d 378, 380 (Ala. 1985)).
220 See id.
221 See id.; U.S. Steel Corp. v. Hoge, 468 A.2d 1380, 1383 (Pa. 1983).
222 See NCNB Tex. Nat'l Bank, 631 So. 2d at 222.
223 See Navarro, supra note 5.
224 See Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 14-17 (Tex.
2008); see Assemb. 11443, 2010 Leg., 233rd Sess. (N.Y. 2010), available at http://assembly.
state.ny.us/leg/?default-fld=&bn=A 1 1443&term=2009&Summary=Y&Text=Y.
225 See Coastal Oil, 268 S.W.3d at 44 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
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trapped in the Marcellus Shale. 2 2 6 The relatively recent introduction of
this process to the region frees legislatures and courts from adopting out-
dated policies that do not reflect proper application of basic legal princi-
ples, and the current environmental and political climate. 2 2 7
In the near future New York State courts will have to render deci-
sions regarding hydraulic fracturing and possible subsurface trespass.
Specifically, the courts must determine whether "the law of capture in-
cludes the right to capture by artificial means or capture by trespass." 228
In New York, as in other states, prior to the development of commercial
oil and gas law, property rights extended from the earth's core to the
limitless sky.2 2 9 As common law developed, New York courts modified
the rule of capture to include the basic doctrine of correlative rights.230
New York subscribes to a modified rule of capture entitling landowners
to compensation for the oil and gas located on their properties. 23 1 Texas,
along with most other traditional oil and gas producing states, does not
subscribe to a modified rule of capture doctrine like New York; for this
and other reasons, such legal precedent presents a poor analytical base
upon which to develop New York law addressing hydraulic fracturing
and subsurface trespass.232
In accordance with New York's historical application of the non-
ownership theory, a modified rule of capture, and Environmental Conser-
vation Law § 23-0301, New York state courts must account for regional
differences, technological advances, and public policy. 2 3 3 New York
state courts should compare hydraulic fracturing with analogically simi-
lar processes-such as directional drilling, fluid injected recovery and
storage operations, and coalbed methane gas production-and find an
actionable subsurface trespass claim where hydraulic fracturing initiated
on one property encroaches on the mineral estate of another.
226 See N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, Marcellus Shale, supra
note 1.
227 See N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF ENvmT. CONSERVATION, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPAcr STATE-
MENT, supra note 9.
228 Gregg v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp., 344 S.W.2d 411, 418 (Tex. 1961).
229 See Ragsdale, supra note 31, at 313
230 See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 23-0301 (McKinney 2007).
231 See E.g., id.; N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 5503; accord Envirogas, Inc. v
Consol. Gas Supply Corp., 98 A.D.2d 119, 122 (1983).
232 See Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 254 S.W. 290, 292 (Tex. 1923).
233 See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 23-0301.
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